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SINDELL V. ABBOTT 
LABORATORIES: A 
NEW AVENUE FOR 
DES LITIGATION 
Michael H. Wells* 
In 1980, the California Supreme Court decided Sindell v. 
Abbott Laboratories.1 The decision advanced important medico-
legal rights for women by significantly developing California 
product liability law.2 Sindell introduced the concept of "market 
share liability"-a potential avenue of recovery for DESs plain-
tiffs seeking redress for injuries resulting from drug exposure 
before birth .. 
• Third Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980) (per Mosk, J.; Bird, C.J., 
Newman and White, J.J., concurring. Richardson, J., dissenting; joined by Clark and 
Manuel, J.J.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980). 
2. See notes 90-124 infra and accompanying text. 
3. Diethylstilbestrol, commonly known as DES, is a synthetic nonsteroidal estrogen. 
MODERN DRUG ENCYCLOPEDIA 309 (A. Lewis ed. 1975). 
4. DES was first synthesized in England in 1938, but was never patented. Because 
DES was less expensive than natural estrogens and could be administered orally, DES 
quickly became popular with the medical community. Comment, DES and a Proposed 
Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 963, 963 n.1 (1978) [hereinafter 
cited as FORDHAM Comment]. A common formula of DES was widely manufactured and 
prescribed in the United States between 1947 and 1971 as a miscarriage preventive. B. 
SEAMAN, WOMEN AND THE CRISIS IN SEX HORMONES 16 (1977). For a comprehensive dis-
cussion of DES, see id., at cbs. 1-3. 
The effects of DES have been detected in both sons and daughters of women who 
took the drug during pregnancy. A discussion of the important and distinctive effects of 
DES on males is beyond the scope of this Note. Nevertheless, the procedural aspects of a 
DES claim (see notes 90-124 infra and accompanying text) should apply to DES sons as 
well as daughters. 
There are two known forms of DES injury in women. The more common, and less 
severe, is vaginal adenosis. Vaginal adenosis is characterized by "tissues placed abnor-
mally on the cervix or vagina." B. SEAMAN, supra note 4, at 3. Vaginal adenosis is a 
precancerous condition. The cancer potential of this tissue in each patient is unknown, 
thus warranting continual monitoring. "The treatment for adenosis is cauterization, sur-
gery, or cyro-surgery. Women who suffer from this condition must be monitored by 
biopsy or coliscopic exanlination twice a year, a painful and expensive procedure. 
Thousands of women whose mothers received DES during pregnancy are unaware of the 
effects of the drug." Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 594, 607 P.2d 924, 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 
133 (1980). 
917 
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Because a plaintiff's mother ingested the particular dosage 
of DES a full generation ago, information about the specific 
manufacturer is most likely unknown or unavailable. Therefore, 
DES suits brought under traditional products liability law have 
universally been rejected for failure to establish causation, due 
to lack of manufacturer identity,5 
In view of the identical formulaS used by defendant manu-
facturers, the California Supreme Court recognized the plain-
tiff's insurmountable burden in identifying the precise 
tortfeasor, and modified traditional tort doctrine.7 Sindell 
adopts market share liability and thereby relieves the DES 
plaintiff of the requirement of identifying precisely which manu-
facturer caused the injury,S 
Sindell allows the DES plaintiff to state a cause of action9 
by joining a substantial share of the appropriate market of drug 
manufacturers;lo any damages would then be apportioned on the 
The second type of DES injury is clear-cell adenocarcinoma. This condition occurs 
when vaginal adenosis has become cancerous. Before 1971, this form of cancer was prac-
tically unknown in vaginal form. Vaginal adenocarcinoma is generally considered to be 
caused by DES. Herbst, Robbay, Scully & Poskanzer, Clear-cell adenocarcinoma of the 
vagina and cervix in girls: Analysis of 170 Registry Cases, 119 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 713, 713 (1974). "It is a fast-spreading and deadly disease, and radical sur-
gery is required to prevent it from spreading." 26 Cal. 3d at 594, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 
Cal. Rptr. at 133. DES, as well as natural estrogens, has also been implicated in the 
development of cancer of the womb. M. DIXON, DRUG PRODUCT LIABn.lTY § 11.27[1] 
(1980). 
5. "An essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action for negligence, or for that 
matter for any other tort, is that there be some reasonable connection between the act or 
omission of the defendant and the damages which the plaintiff has suffered." W. PROS-
SER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 236 (4th ed. 1971). 
Application of black letter causation law in the DES context commonly led to sum-
marY judgments for defendants. See, e.g., Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. 
Tex. 1978); McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1978); 
Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979). 
6. 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. "[T]he various manufac-
turers of DES used the same formula, and as a result, pharmacists apparently had a 
practice of substituting one brand for another .•.. " Kroll, Intra-Industry Joint Liabil-
ity: The Era of Absolute Products Liability, 1980 INs. L.J. 185, 187. 
7. 26 Cal. 3d at 611,607 P.2d 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. 
8.Id. 
9. See notes 90-124 infra and accompanying text. 
10. See 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937,163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The appropriate 
manufacturers appear to be those companies which can be shown to have produced and 
marketed DES at the time and place in which plaintiff's mother purchased the drug. 
Drug companies would be permitted to remove themselves from the class of potential 
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basis of each manufacturer's share of the DES market at the 
time plaintiff's mother took the drug.H In response, a vigorous 
dissent denounced market share liability as a "wholly new the-
ory"12 which "abandons the traditional requirement of some 
causal connection between defendants' act and plaintiffs' 
injury .... "18 
Plaintiff Judith Sindell14 filed suitI5 against eleven drug 
companiesI6 alleging, under several theories,17 that she was inju-
riously exposed to DES before birth as a result of the testing, 
marketing, and promotion of the drug by defendants.I8 Each 
cause of action attempted to shift the burden of proof from 
plaintiff to defendant and to establish a basis for finding joint 
deCendants iC they could demonstrate they did not manufacture the particular dosage in 
question. ld. at 596 n.4, 607 P.2d at 927 n.4, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135 n.4. A declaration that 
one company did not manufacture DES until after plaintiff was born enabled one oC the 
Sindell deCendants to be dismissed from the action. ld. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937,163 Cal. 
Rptr. at 145. The opinion itself, however, does not specifically define "appropriate 
market." 
11. ld. at 614, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146. 
12.ld. 
13. ld. at 615, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133. 
14. Judith Sindell's action was consolidated on appeal with that oC plaintiff Mau-
reen Rogers. Upon trial court dismissal, Rogers amended her complaint to identify one oC 
the deCendants, Eli Lilly & Co., as the precise manufacturer of the dosage taken by her 
mother. The court noted that the discussion of market share liability would, therefore, 
apply to Rogers only if she failed to establish causation by Eli Lilly & Co. at a subse-
quent trial on the merits. The entire opinion is therefore directed toward plaintiff 
Sindell.ld. at 597,607 P.2d at 927,163 Cal. Rptr. at 135. 
15. Ms. Sindell sued both on her own behalf and as a class representative for all 
women similarly situated. ld. at 593, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133. 
16. DeCendant pharmaceutical companies included E.R. Squibb & Sons, Upjohn Co., 
Abbott Laboratories, Eli Lilly & Co., and Rexall Drug Co. ld. at 596 n.4, 607 P.2d at 927 
n.4, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135 n.4. 
17. Ms. Sindell sued on the basis of negligence, insufficient industrY-wide standards, 
strict liability, violation of express and implied warranties, false and fraudulent represen-
tation, drug misbranding in violation of federal law, conspiracy, and "lack of consent." 
ld. at 595, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. 
18. Plaintiff's injuries included vaginal adenosis and a malignant· bladder tumor 
which had to be surgically removed. For the rest of her life, Ms. Sindell will require 
constant monitoring by biopsy and calposcopy to insure early warning oC further malig-
nant growth. ld. at 594-95,607 P.2d at 926,163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. 
A 1974 study of 154 persons previously treated Cor clear-cell vaginal adenocarcinoma 
found that 24% had had recurrences and that 16% had died. In 33% of the cases the 
Collow-up period was less than two years after discoverY of the condition. A 16% death 
rate within two-years illustrates how quickly DES-related cancer develops and how fatal 
it can be. For a complete analysis of this problem, see Herbst, Robbay, Scully & Pos-
kanzer, supra note 4, at 713. 
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and severalliability.19 Nevertheless, the trial court granted de-
fendants' demurrers on the basis of plaintiff's failure to allege 
causation. 20 
On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that Ms. Sindell sufficiently identified the wrongdoer by joining, 
as defendants, those who represented "a substantial share of the 
appropriate market .... "21 The court stated that this satisfied 
plaintiff's burden of proof.22 The defendants may then cross-
complain against other DES manufactUrers that have not been 
joined, in an effort to match liability with each manufacturer's 
responsibility for the injuries caused by its own products.23 Any 
damages awarded would then be apportioned on the basis of 
California doctrines of partial indemnity and comparative fault, 
as modified by market share liability.24 
This reduction of the level of plaintiff's burden of proof lies 
19. Telephone interview with Jason G. Brent, Attorney for Appellant Judith Sindell 
(Nov. 18, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Brent interview). 
20. The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend on the ground 
that plaintiff admitted she could not identify which defendant manufactured the drug 
that caused her injury and, therefore, dismissed the action. 26 Cal. 3d at 596, 607 P.2d at 
926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. 
21. Id. at 612,607 P.2d at 937,163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. 
22.Id. 
23. Id. See note 104 infra and accompanying text. 
24. In Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226,119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975), 
California adopted the comparative fault system. In American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Supe-
rior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978), the California Su-
preme Court held that negligence damages may be apportioned on a percentage-of-fault 
basis between one or more defendants and a negligent plaintiff-a system of implied 
partial indemnity. The jury may make special findings to indicate which theory of liabil-
ity was relied upon (e.g., negligence or strict liability), and the percentage of fault attrib-
utable to each party. Li, 13 Cal. 3d 804, 823-24, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 
872 (1975). 
In Safeway Stores v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 332, 579 P.2d 441, 446, 146 Cal. 
Rptr. 550, 555 (1978), the California Supreme Court stated that "the comparative indem-
nity doctrine may be utilized to allocate liability between a negligent and a strictly liable 
defendant." 
In Nest-Kart, plaintiff was injured by a shopping cart manufactured by defendant A 
and sold to supermarket B. The trial court found equitable indemnity did not apply to 
the comparative fault facts. The supreme court reversed, finding no distinction between 
strict liability and negligence actions which would disqualify strict liability from implied 
partial indemnity apportionment. This indicates that in DES liability cases, strictly lia-
ble and negligent defendants may all be responsible under the court's market share the-
ory. For further discussion of market share liability, see notes 90-124 infra and accompa-
nying text. 
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at the core of market share liability. By recognizing that rigid 
adherence to prior doctrine controverted "traditional goals of tort 
law, the California Supreme Court in Sindell significantly ex-
panded product liability law in the area of injurious fungible 
goods.211 
I. EARLY FDA REGULATIONS AND THE QUESTION-
ABLE UTILITY OF DES 
Before an effective ban on DES use went into effect in 
1971,26 doctors prescribed DES for a variety of obstetrical pur-
poses, primarily to prevent premature childbirth.27 DES is still 
marketed, however, for uses that do not implicate fetal 
development.28 
DES was never patented. To capitalize quickly on a rapidly 
developing market, and to avoid the expense of creating varients 
of DES, a group of twelve drug companies jointly submitted 
clinical data and a "new drug application" to the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) in 1941.29 At that time, FDA regulations 
25. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144. 
26. In 1971 the Federal Drug Administration effectively banned the use of DES by 
requiring companies marketing the drug to place a warning label on DES containers 
indicating that DES appeared related to an increasing incidence of vaginal cancer in 
daughters of women who took the drug. At that time the FDA also began studies to 
determine the relationship between mothers who used DES and daughters who suffered 
vaginal cancer. The FDA studies began as a result of the alarming increase in the inci-
dence of vaginal adenocarcinoma. See generally u.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEP'T OF 
H.E.W. DRUG BULLETIN, DIETHYLSTILBESTROL CONTRAINDICATED IN PREGNANCY (1971). 
For a good discussion of the regulatory history of DES, see FORDHAM Comment, supra 
note 4, at 963-66. 
27. Prescription of DES became so popular that many doctors considered DES as 
somewhat of a reproductive tract cure-all. Doctors prescribed DES to decrease the inci-
dence of late toxemias, to decrease prematurity and stillbirth, and to increase the si2e of 
babies born prematurely. Dieckmann, Davis, Rynkiewicz & Pottinger, Does the Adminis-
tration of Diethystilbestrol During Pregnancy Have Therapeutic Value?, 66 AM. J. OB-
STETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1062, 1074 (1953). Toxemia is defined as an abnormal condition 
associated with the presence of toxic substances in the blood. WEBSTER'S THmD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2419 (1976). 
28. Such uses include the suppression of lactation, post-coital contraception, meno-
pausal disturbances, and treatment for prostrate cancer, among others. Diethystilbestrol 
(DES): Hearings on Title I of S. 963 Before the Subcomm. on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1975). See also FORDHAM Comment, supra note 4, at 
963. 
29. FORDHAM Comment, supra note 4, at 976. A new drug application consists of an 
application for approval of a new drug accompanied by reports of drug safety, efficacy, 
formula, and ingredients. A list of suggested controls for marketing and manufacture was 
also submitted. Joint submission of a new drug application was attractive because, in 
5
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did not require an affirmative showing of drug efficacy.3o 
An affirmative showing of DES efficacy would have proved 
difficult because, as early as 1942, and somewhat regularly there-
after, scientific studies criticized and rejected the earlier studies 
favorable to DES use as a miscarriage preventive.31 
By 1971, DES had been termed only "possibly effective" by 
the FDA for the prevention of "accidents of pregnancy," a regu-
latory stage which indicates the presence of known dangers.32 As 
a "possibly effective" drug, manufacturers were permitted, and 
indeed continued, to market DES for these purposes for several 
years.33 
II. PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENTS 
In Sindell, plaintiffs based their arguments on three theo-
ries of product liability: alternative liability; concerted action; 
and enterprise, or industry-wide, liability.3~ 
These three theories are similar in that they allow plaintiffs 
to shift the burden of proof.35 If defendants are unable to prove 
cases where a drug was already patented or a licensing arrangement was unavailable, a 
company would have been forced to finance the creation of formulas which varied little 
from the patented drug. Therefore, the joint submission of a new drug application saved 
a substantial amount of money. The initial FDA approval of DES was limited to treat-
ment regarding estrogen problems. Not until 1947 was DES initially approved for use in 
pregnancy complications. For a general discussion of the new drug application, see id. 
30. "A new drug application became 'effective' automatically if the Secretary of 
Health, Education and Welfare failed within a certain period of time to disapprove the 
application. . . . Since 1962, affirmative approval of an application has been required 
before a new drug may be marketed." 26 Cal. 3d at 604 n.19, 607 P.2d at 932 n.19, 163 
Cal. Rptr. at 140 n.19. 
In 1962, 21 U.S.C. § 355 was amended to improve the effectiveness of drug licensing 
requirements. Mter that time, former applicants with FDA-approved drugs were re-
quired to provide the FDA with new reports and records of drug efficacy and safety. See 
Act of October 10, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(d), 76 Stat. 781-85. 
31. See, Kranaky, The Use of Stilbestrol for the Treatment of Threatened and Ha-
bitual Abortion and Premature Labor: A Preliminary Report, 35 S. MED. J. 838 (1942); 
Smith, Diethylstilbestrol in the Prevention and Treatment of Complications of Preg-
nancy, 56 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 821 (1948). 
32. 36 Fed. Reg. 21,537 (1971). This development occurred as a result of the 1962 
amendments discussed at note 30 supra .• 
33. The marketing of "possibly effective" drugs was prohibited in 1973. 38 Fed. Reg. 
26,824 (1973). 
34. 26 Cal. 3d at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136. 
35. See notes 36-89 infra and accompanying text. 
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they did not manufacture the drug which caused the injury, each 
theory allows imposition of joint and several liability. The origin 
and rationale underlying each theory, however, varies greatly. 
A. ALTERNATIVE LIABILITY 
Alternative liability arose as a cure for plaintiff causation 
problems.36 Under an alternative liability theory defendants may 
act independently and yet be held liable for plaintiff's injury. 
Introduced in Summers v. Tice,87 and incorporated in the Re-
statement of Torts,38 alternative liability is illustrated by the 
classic hypothetical involving plaintiff and two hunters. Both 
hunters simultaneously and negligently fired their guns in plain-
tiff's direction, causing injury. Because it is impossible to deter-
mine which hunter fired the shot that struck plaintiff, the court 
required each hunter to bear the burden of proving innocence.39 
The rule of Summers v. Tice requires that in cases where all 
defendants are equally culpable, and their negligence precludes 
an innocent plaintiff from identifying them, basic considerations 
of fairness demand that the burden of proof shift from plaintiff 
to defendant.40 Defendants unable to meet the burden of proof 
are found jointly and severally liable."! 
In Summers, the court employed alternative liability and 
found fairness to demand that, as between unascertainable neg-
ligent defendants and an innocent plaintiff, defendants should 
bear the burden of proof."2 The Sindell court analyzed an alter-
native liability theory on the basis of Summers v. Tice43 and 
Ybarra v. Spangard.44 The court found Sindell to be similar to 
36. w. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 243. 
37. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). 
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433(b)(3) (1965). The facts of Summers v. 
Tice form the basis of illustration (9). 
39. 33 Cal. 2d at 80, 88, 199 P.2d at 5. 
40. [d. "'To hold otherwise would be to exonerate both [defendants] from liability, 
although each was negligent, and the injury resulted from such negligence.' " 33 Cal. 2d 
at 85, 199 P.2d at 3 (quoting with approval Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852, 854, 110 So. 
666, 668 (1927». 
41. [d. at 88, 199 P.2d at 5. 
42. [d. 
43. [d. at 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). 
44. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). Ybarra involved a plaintiff who, while un-
conscious during surgery, was injured by one of the doctors or nurses attending him. The 
court found that, because the defendants controlled the instruments which caused the 
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Summers and Ybarra because in each case, througp. no fault of 
the plaintiff, the circumstances of the injury rendered identifica-
tion of the wrongdoer impossible. Nevertheless, a sufficient fac-
tual dissimilarity between the three cases led the Sindell court 
to decline to shift the burden of proof to defendants under the 
alternative liability theory;U 
The court distinguished the cases factually on two main is-
sues. Unlike the product liability context of Sindell, alternative 
liability as established in Summers involved a pure claim of neg-
ligence.46 The fairness concerns stressed in Summers were there-
fore not as compelling in the product liability situation, where 
certain proof requisites are relaxed.47 Application of a theory of 
alternative liability could also be questioned because, in Sum-
mers, all potential defendants were present and ascertainable; 
one of the two hunters clearly caused the injury. Sindell, on the 
other hand, involved a large number of possible, yet not ascer-
tainable, defendants.4s On such facts, application of alternative 
liability could cause a company which did not manufacture the 
injury-producing dosage of DES to be held jointly and severally 
liable.49 While all possible defendants were joined in Summers, 
only five of 200 possible defendants remained joined by the time 
injury, they were better able to identify the wrongdoer than was the unconscious plain-
tiff. For that reason, the court shifted the burden of proof to defendants. ld. 
45. 26 Cal. 3d at 603,607 P.2d at 931,163 Cal. Rptr. at 139. 
46. 33 Cal. 2d at 83,199 P.2d at 2. 
47. Strict product liability differs from actions in negligence in that product liability 
requires no proof of a duty of due care to the injured plaintiff. The commercial context 
renders this showing unnecessary; the duty is implied. The elements of plaintiff's cause 
of action include causation, defect, and a showing the defect existed when the product 
left the manufacturer. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 671-72. 
48. Of the eleven drug companies originally joined as defendants in Sindell, the 
court noted, "[h]ere, by contrast, there are approximately 200 drug companies which 
made DES, any of which might have manufactured the injury-producing drug." 26 Cal. 
3d at 602, 607 P.2d at 931,163 Cal. Rptr. at 139. Increase in the number of defendants 
who may have produced the DES which injured plaintiff proportionately reduces the 
chance that anyone defendant sold plaintiff's mother the harm-causing drug. For exam-
ple, where there are two defendants, there exists a 50% chance of causation each; if 20 
defendants, a 5% chance each. Application of alternative liability where there is a 95% 
chance of innocence for each defendant may strain the concept beyond logic. See FORD-
HAM Comment, supra note 4, at 994-95, for further discussion of chances of causation. 
49. One commentator considered this problem with alternative liability critical. 
"First, if even one tortfeasor is absent, and it was he who actually caused the plaintiffs' 
injury, then only the [non-injuring] defendants may be held liable." FORDHAM Comment, 
supra note 4, at 991. 
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of trial in Sindell.lSo As a result, the court found the possibility 
that the joined defendants supplied DES to plaintiff's mother to 
be "so remote that it would be unfair to require each defendant 
to exonerate itself."ISI The Summers theory was rejected, how-
ever, only "as previously applied."1S2 
B. CONCERTED ACTION 
Plaintiffs also attempted to ground a claim of defendant lia-
bility in a theory of concerted action. The nature of the drug 
industry and the early FDA regulation under which DES was 
marketedlS3 could arguably have served as the basis for a claim of 
concerted action. 
The theory of concerted action derives from vicarious liabil-
ity.M Courts require that a plaintiff show a tacit agreement 
50. 26 Cal. 3d at 602-03, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139. Some estimates of 
the possible number of DES-producing companies run as high as 300. FORDHAM Com-
ment, supra note 4, at 964. Sindell plaintiffs originally joined eleven of the largest do-
mestic drug companies in an effort to join enough defendants to satisfy causation at the 
trial court level. By the time the case came before the California Supreme Court only 
five defendants remained. 26 Cal. 3d at 596, 607 P.2d at 927, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135. 
The strength of the distinguishing factor mentioned in the text is diminished be-
cause plaintiff joined five drug companies which constituted 90% of the possible defen-
dants. As a result it was highly probable that one of the joined defendants supplied the 
DES taken by Sindell's mother. ld. at 612,607 P.2d at 937,163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. This 
factor adds weight to the view held by some that the real purpose behind the court's 
imposition of market share liability was a limitation of defendant's possible joint and 
several liability. Brent interview, supra note 19. 
If the court imposed market share liability, each defendant would be responsible for 
damages based on their share of DES sales rather than, as in joint and several liability, 
the entire judgment. To illustrate: only A and B are joined as defendants. A has a 20% 
share of the market and B has a 10% share of the market. Both A and B share 100% of 
the responsibility for plaintiff's injury. If A goes bankrupt or is immune from process, B 
bears full responsibility for 100% of the damages (if in both examples plaintiff is not 
negligent). This is the problem addressed by the Sindell court's substantial percentage 
requirement of market share liability. See notes 111-124 infra and accompanying text, 
for further discussion. 
5l. 26 Cal. 3d at 603, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139. It is possible that the 
court sought to avoid imposing strict product liability on the defendant. In strict product 
liability, plaintiff must prove fewer requisites for a finding of liability than in negligence. 
See note 47 supra. 
52. 26 Cal. 3d at 603, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139. This phrase may indi-
cate that the California Supreme Court considers market share liability to be a new ap-
plication of alternative liability. 
53. See notes 26-33 supra and accompanying text. 
54. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 29l. A finding of vicarious liability in tum requires 
a showing of joint enterprise. ld. 
9
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among defendants to perform a tortious act.1i1i Plaintiff's showing 
that a certain defendant helped plan and facilitate a tortious act 
with other defendants would support a finding of a tacit agree-
ment.lis However, mere knowledge of the tortious acts of others 
will not suffice; some element of planning is required.1i7 The ra-
tionale for the theory lies in the deterrence of dangerous group 
conduct. liS 
The Sindell plaintiffs alleged a tacit agreement on the basis 
of mutual reliance on inadequate "testing, marketing, methods, 
lack of warnings, ... and other acts and omissions" by the drug 
companies.1i9 Plaintiffs argued that such imitative parallel con-
duct was tortious and therefore actionable as concerted action.so 
Nevertheless, even though plaintiffs may have correctly de-
scribed the common practices of the drug industry, the court 
stated that the allegations failed to describe a tacit agreement to 
conduct inadequate tests, to give insufficient warnings, or to en-
gage in other tortious conduct.s1 The court appeared to require 
that the conduct at issue be recognizably tortious, or that it be 
directly connected with the plaintiff over a short period of time, 
in order to find liability under a concerted action theory.s2 Oth-
erwise, the doctrine "would render virtually any manufacturer 
55. Id. at 292. 
56. One commentator provides the following example of concerted action: "Assume 
A, B, and C participate in [an automobile] race and P, a bystander, is injured by A's car. 
P may sue A or B or C or any combination thereof, and each of the three is jointly and 
severally liable for P's injury. P need only allege that each defendant he has joined 
helped plan and facilitate the race, that the participation of each was tortious, and that 
his injury resulted from the race." FORDHAM Comment, supra note 4, at 979. 
57. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 292. The Restatement requires a showing that a 
defendant: 
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to 
a common design with him, or (b) knows that the other's con-
duct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assis-
tance or encouragement to the other to so conduct himself, or 
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a 
tortious result and his own conduct, separately considere~, 
constitutes a breach of duty to the third person. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (a}-(c) (1979). 
58. Hall v. E.!. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 372 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
59. 26 Cal. 3d at 604-05,607 P.2d at 932,163 Cal. Rptr. at 140. 
60.Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 605-06, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141. 
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liable for the defective products of an entire industry, even if it 
could be demonstrated that the product which caused the injury 
was not made by the defendant. "68 
The rationale behind concerted action and alternative liabil-
ity differ greatly. One seeks the deterrence of tortious group con-
duct; the other is basically a method of establishing causation.64 
Because the Sindell facts fell squarely into neither theory, the 
court rejected both.6G 
c. INDUSTRy-WIDE LIABILITY 
Industry-wide liability is a hybrid of elements of alternative 
liability and concerted action.66 While similar to concerted ac-
tion in that it requires plaintiff to prove defendants engaged in 
tortious conduct, this element is greatly modified.6'1 Industry-
wide liability is also similar to alternative liability,66 as it may be 
invoked to alleviate causation problems in cases involving multi-
ple negligent but unascertainable defendants.69 
A theory of industry-wide liability involves more than a 
merger of the elements mentioned above. The unique aspect of 
industry-wide liability is the proof of imitative practices which 
may pervade an entire industry.'1O In Sindell, plaintiff alleged 
that defendants individually relied on the testing, manufactur-
63. [d. at 605, 607 P.2d at 933,163 Cal. Rptr. at 141. Nevertheless, the dissent states 
that, by adopting market share liability, the majority arrives at precisely this result. [d. 
at 616, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147. 
64. For a discussion of alternative liability see notes 36-52 supra and accompanying 
text. "The legal theory of concert seems to have evolved in order to deter hazardous 
group behavior rather than because the actual injury-producing party could not be iden-
tified • • • • FORDHAM Comment, supra note 4, at 979. 
65. See notes 51 & 63 supra and accompanying text. 
66. Industry-wide liability is discussed in the context of DES as "enterprise liabil-
ity" in FORDHAM Comment, supra note 4, at 995-1006. For the suggested seven part 
model, see note 83 infra. Enterprise liability is the term under which Sindell plaintiffs 
alleged a cause of action. 26 Cal. 3d at 607,607 P.2d at 934,163 Cal. Rptr. at 142. The 
court itself, however, preferred the term "industry-wide liability." [d. 
67. See notes 70-75 infra and accompanying text. 
68. See notes 36-52 supra and accompanying text. 
Both alternative liability and industry-wide liability derive from the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior. For a discussion of these theories in the context of the employer's 
willingness to engage in high risk conduct, see FORDHAM Comment, supra note 4, at 996-
99. 
69. FORDHAM Comment, supra note 4, at 995. 
70. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 608, 607 P.2d at 934, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 142. 
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ing standards, labeling, and product literature of the entire DES 
industry,71 much as in a concerted action claim.72 The distin-
guishing factor between the two theories lies in the type of evi-
dence plaintiff must bring forward. A concerted action claim re-
quires an explicit or implicit agreement to engage in tortious 
conduct.73 The type of evidence in an industry-wide liability 
claim, on the other hand, does not rest on proof of any agree-
ment, implied or otherwise. Rather, the injury arises out of "an 
insufficient industry standard."7' 
This focus on the joint activities of industry 
members is analogous to the "agreement" re-
quirement in concert cases, and also reflects the 
purpose of those cases-to deter similar behavior 
in the future. Unlike concert, however, the paral-
lel behavior of defendants, absent any under-
standing among them, is sufficient to prove this 
element.75 
This theory conceives of the existence of insufficient industry 
standards and practices as the source and cause of the injury. 
As a second distinguishing feature, industry-wide -liability 
introduces risk allocation into product liability.76 This concept is 
based on the idea that accidents and injuries are an inevitable 
aspect of any manufactured product, and, as such, represent a 
forseeable cost to defendants as a part of the manufacturing 
process and product exploitation.77 The more control the manu-
facturer has over risks caused by its products, the more forsee-
able and accountable the manufacturer is for the harm, and the 
more likely a finding of liability.78 If the injury was forseeable by 
71. [d. 
72. See text accompanying note 59 supra. 
73. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 292. 
74. FORDHAM Comment, supra note 4, at 997. 
75. [d. 
76. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.7, at 1377 (1956). 
77. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 
697 (1963). Greenman indicates that where there are inherent public risks in the process 
of creating a marketable product from an inchoate idea, manufacturers rather than con-
sumers should bear the costs created by those risks. "The purpose of such liability is to 
insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manu-
facturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who 
are powerless to protect themselves." [d. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 70l. 
78. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 644. 
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virtue of the insufficient industry standard, defendants must in-
dividually prove their product could not have caused the harm 
suffered by plaintiff.79 
Industry-wide liability and risk allocation are discussed in 
Hall v. E. 1. Du Pont De Nemours CO.,80 in which several chil-
dren were injured by blasting caps.81 Hall holds that when de-
fendants act independently in adhering to an inadequate indus-
try-wide product safety standard, joint liability will not 
automatically be imposed, but the burden of proof will shift to 
defendants.82 The shift of the burden of proof was critical in 
Hall because, as in Sindell, the evidence of the tortious act had 
been destroyed or lost at the time of injury. 
The Sindell court considered industry-wide liability in the 
context of a seven part formula which proposed to apply indus-
try-wide liability to DES cases.88 Although much of this formula 
79. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 608-09, 607 P.2d at 934, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 142. 
80. 354 F. Supp. 650 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
81. Hall involved 12 separate accidents in which 13 children were injured. Plaintiffs 
sued six corporations and an industry trade association. The evidence determining which 
manufacturer caused the alleged harm was destroyed in each incident in which the blast-
ing caps exploded. The accidents occured over a four year period between 1955 and 1959. 
ld. at 359. 
82. "[T]he existence of industry-wide standards or practices alone will not support, 
in all circumstances, the imposition of joint liability. But where • • • individual defen-
dant-manufacturers cannot be identified, the existence of industry-wide standards or 
practices could support a finding of joint control of risk • . . a shift of the burden of 
proving causation to the defendants." ld. at 374. 
The specific theory upon which Hall is based is somewhat unclear. The opinion re-
versed the dismissal of plaintiff's claim on the basis of defendants' "joint knowledge and 
action." Although there were allegations that the six corporate defendants had delegated 
certain safety functions to the trade association, id. at 359, Hall never discussed allega-
tions or findings of a tacit agreement to engage in tortious conduct. The California Su-
preme Court stated that industry-wide liability was suggested by Hall. 26 Cal. 3d at 607, 
607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141. This would emphasi2e the insufficient industry 
standard factor. The FORDHAM Comment, however, on which much of Sindell's industry-
wide discussion is based, asserts that Hall "is the major case. . . where concert has been 
applied." FORDHAM Comment, supra note 4, at 981. This interpretation would emphasi2e 
the notion that the tacit agreement factor is paramount. This inconsistency underscores 
the difficulty in determining the theoretical bases for recovery involved in a given fact 
situation. 
83. The elements of industry-wide liability are: 
1) Plaintiff is not at fault for his inability to identify the caus-
ative agent and such liability is due to the nature of the defen-
dant's conduct. 
2) A generically similar defective product was manufactured 
by all the defendants. 
13
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is taken from Hall,84 the Sindell court decided that the theory, 
as articulated in Hall, could not be extended to the entire DES 
drug industry.811 The Sindell court rejected industry-wide liabil-
ity for three basic reasons: 
1) The standards relied upon by defendants were mandated 
by the FDA. 86 Because the FDA played a pervasive role in the 
drug testing and marketing process, imposition of liability would 
be unfair. 87 
2) In Hall, as opposed to Sindell, certain safety functions 
had been delegated to an industry-wide trade association which 
was also joined as a defendant.88 
3) Whereas Hall involved only six manufacturers, which 
represented the entire blasting cap industry, Sindell involved 
only five of a possible 200 DES manufacturers.89 
3) Plaintiff's injury was caused by this product defect. 
4) The defendants owed a duty to the class of which plaintiff 
was a member. 
5) There is clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff's in-
jury was caused by the product of some one of the defendants. 
For example, the joined defendants accounted for a high per-
centage of such defective products on the market at the time 
of plaintiff's injury. 
6) There existed an insufficient, industry-wide standard. of 
safety as to the manufacture of this product. 
7) All defendants were tortfeasors satisfying the requirements 
of whichever cause of action is proposed: negligence, warranty, 
or strict liability. 
26 Cal. 3d at 608-09 n.24, 607 P.2d at 935 n.24, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 194 n.24. This list of 
elements varies only in order from that suggested in FORDHAM Comment, supra note 4, 
at 995. 
84. See FORDHAM Comment, supra note 4, at 997 n.194, in which the author traces 
elements of industry-wide liability to the Hall opinion. 
85. 26 Cal. 3d at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143. 
86. [d. 
87. [d. at 610, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143. Where a large number of 
manufacturers were unascertained defendants, there would be less than a 50% chance 
that each defendant caused the harm alleged. In such a case, Sindell stated that defen-
dants following industry standards regulated by FDA were unlikely to be sufficiently 
culpable to justify imposition of joint and several liability. 
88. 345 F. Supp. at 378. See also Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. 
Rptr. at 143. 
89. 26 Cal. 3d at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143. 
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III. MARKET SHARE LIABILITY 
A. DISTINGUISHING INDUSTRy-WIDE LIABILITY 
Although Sindell rejected the specific theories argued by 
plaintiffs, the court found certain elements of the arguments to 
be persuasive.90 A broad policy argument implicit in plaintiff's 
arguments enabled the court to adopt a market share theory of 
liability. The court introduced market share theory by noting 
that fungible goods in modern society can create harm which is 
not traceable to a particular manufacturer.91 Citing Escola v. 
Coca Cola Bottling CO.92 and section 433B of the Restatement of 
Torts,93 the Sindell court adapted the elements of plaintiff's 
causes of action to avoid the inequitable results which it had 
previously found objectionable.9• 
Market share liability is perhaps best illustrated by compar-
ison with industry-wide liability, which the court ostensibly re-
jected. Viewed in this light, very little of market share theory is 
entirely new.915 Nearly all the elements of industry-wide liability 
are incorporated into market share liability. 
1) Plaintiff is not at fault for his or her inability to identify 
the causative agent when such inability is due to the nature of 
defendants' conduct. This requirement is plainly adopted in 
market share by the Sindell court.96 
2) A generically similar defective product was manufactured 
90. ld. at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. 
91.ld. 
92. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). "[I]n an era of mass production and com-
plex marketing methods the traditional standard of negligence [is] insufficient to govern 
the obligations of manufacturers to consumer .•.. " 26 Cal. 3d at 610,607 P.2d at 936, 
163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. Sindell found Escola to mandate not only application of a product 
liability theory but also adaption of the rules of causation and liability. The court further 
noted that the Restatement would allow modification of a Summers rule in a Sindell-like 
situation. ld. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B, comment (g) (1965). 
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (1965). 
94. For the objectionable elements of plaintiff's causes of action, see notes 46-51, 61-
63, 86-89 supra and accompanying text. 
95. The dissent refers to m~ket share liability and "the substantially identical" in-
dustry-wide liability as "wholly new." 26 Cal. 3d at 614, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. 
at 146 (Richardson, J., dissenting; Clark and Manuel, J.J., concurring). 
96. "Here, as in Summers, plaintiff is not at fault in failing to provide evidence of 
causation .... " ld. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. 
15
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by all of the defendants.91 The majority notes that the plaintiffs 
alleged this element in their complaint.98 
3) Plaintiff's injury was caused by this product defect. The 
court notes that the plaintiffs alleged this element.99 
4) The defendants owed a duty to the class of which plain-
tiff was a member. Because plaintiffs in strict product liability 
cases are not required to show defendant's duty of due care, and 
market share liability is a strict product liability theory, a duty 
of due care is not .required.loo 
5) .There is clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff's in-
jury was caused by the product of some one of the defendants.lol 
Because plaintiffs allegedly joined 90 percent of the possible de-
fendants, the court found that plaintiffs demonstrated this req-
uisite under a market share theory.lo2 
6) All defendants are tortfeasors satisfying the requirements 
of whichever cause of action is proposed: negligence, warranty, 
or strict liability. lOS The court noted that under market share 
97. Id. at 593, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133. 
98. Id. at 605, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141. 
99. Id. at 593, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133. This element is a requisite for 
any action in strict product liability. As an evidentiary matter it should present no prob-
lem because clear-cell vaginal adenocarcinoma is a rare form of cancer uniquely attribu-
table to the ingestion of DES by pregnant women. See 40 Fed. Reg. 32,773 (1975), for 
some documentation of the assocation between DES ingestion and vaginal adenosis. 
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965). Although the court men-
tioned no duty element, market share liability is not restricted to strict product liability. 
One commentator views the court as certifying a cause of action in DES market share 
negligence and suggests such a cause of action be pleaded in each new suit. 1 CAL. TORT 
REP. 106 (1980). 
101. Evidence that the joined defendants accounted for a high percentage of the 
defective products on the market at the time of plaintiffs' injury would be sufficient. 26 
Cal. 3d at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143. 
102. Plaintiffs alleged joinder of 90% of the possible DES defendants. "If at trial 
this is established to be the fact, then there is a corresponding likelihood that this com-
parative handful of producers manufactured the DES which caused plaintiffs injuries 
.... " Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The Sindell court finds the 
joinder of a substantial percentage of the possible defendants equivalent to what is re-
ferred to in the text as "clear and convincing evidence." Id. This is in contrast to the 75-
80% joinder suggested as "clear and convincing" in FORDHAM Comment, supra note 4, at 
995. See notes 111-124 infra and accompanying text, for further analysis of joinder for 
market share liability. 
103. 26 Cal. 3d at 602, 607 P.2d at 930-31, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138-39. 
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liability a defendant may avoid liability by showing it could not 
have manufactured the injury-producing drug.10• 
7) An insufficient industry-wide standard of safety existed 
for the manufacture of this product. 1011 The court rejects only 
this element of the proposed industry-wide test in its formula-
tion of a market share liability theory. As previously noted, the 
court found it unfair to impose liability simply because defen-
dants followed standards mandated by the FDA.l06 
Arguably, drug companies may have helped create the stan-
dards upon which they rely to avoid liability in Sindell. l07 The 
court's refusal to adopt the final element, however, indicates it 
believed the Sindell facts would not support theories based 
upon an insufficient industry-wide standard of safety. In fact, 
the court's reliance on Summers v. Tice as support for market 
share liabilityl08 indicates the court wished to ground market 
share causation in traditional tort law. The court's approach, 
therefore, becomes perplexing in the event of joinder of a low 
(e.g., sixty-five percent), but still "substantial" percentage of 
possible defendants. 
The court's use of Summers invites an investigation which 
leads to the heart of the Sindell controversy: the substantial 
percentage requirement and the method of damage apportion-
ment.109 A discussion of these controversial elements of market 
104. One Sindell defendant successfully demurred on this basis and was dismissed 
from the action after proving it did not manufacture DES until after plaintiff was born. 
ld. 
105. ld. at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143. 
106. ld. 
107. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) is an extremely power-
ful drug company lobby which has for years maintained a close working relationship with 
the FDA. Arguably, the relationship is so close that the FDA may have, under PMA 
influence, allowed the marketing of drugs which had been inadequately tested for safety 
and efficacy. "This [close relationship] can be readily seen in the changes which occur 
after notices of proposed rule making. Often a proposal will be diluted or eliminated 
after the industry raises objections. Informal meetings between the FDA and PMA are 
held on a frequent, regular basis." M. DIXON, supra note 4, at § 6.01. See notes 26-33 
supra and accompanying text, for further discussion of the regulatory history of DES. 
108. "The most persuasive reason for finding plaintiff states a cause of action is that 
advanced in Summers: As between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the 
latter should bear the cost of the injury." 26 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. 
Rptr. at 144. 
109. One commentator suggests that, in jurisdictions which have adopted compara-
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share liability form the heart of the dissent.llo 
B. JOINDER OF A SUBSTANTIAL PERCENTAGE 
Although the court found alternative liability inapplicable 
to the Sindell facts as the theory existed in its Summers-based 
construct, the court did find it possible to solve plaintiffs' causa-
tion problems by use of a "diluted" Summers rule. l11 The 
Sindell court held that when a substantial percentage o( the 
possible defendants are joined in an action, the corresponding 
likelihood that the company which manufactured the particular 
DES ingested by plaintiff's mother would escape liability is so 
diminished that it is reasonable to shift the burden of proof 
from plaintiffs to defendantsp2 In this manner Sindell elimi-
nates the Summers requirement of joinder of 100 percent of the 
possible wrongdoers. 
Unfortunately, the court did not clarify what would meet 
the substantial joinder requirement.lls The opinion reveals only 
that joinder of ninety· percent of the market share defendants, as 
in Sindell, constitutes a substantial percentage.Ui However, the 
court also suggested that even less than seventy-five percent 
may be considered a substantial percentage.llG 
tive negligence, apportionment of damages according to market share is appropriate for a 
theory of industry-wide liability. "Much of the strength and justice of enterprise liability 
rests in the suggestion that damages be apportioned among defendants in proportion to 
their market shares." FORDHAM Comment, supra note 4, at 999. The suggestion arises 
that the Sindell court could have avoided a departure from traditional tort theory, yet 
achieved substantially the same result. Nevertheless, the Sindell court creates a system 
of damages apportionment which, with a high percentage of defendant joinder, is clearly 
more desirable than industry-wide liability. In such a case market share is closely analo-
gous to a Summers or 100% joinder rule. 
110. 26 Cal. 3d at 614-22, 607 P.2d at 938-43, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146-51 (Richardson, 
J., dissenting; Clark and Manuel, J.J., concurring). 
111. ld. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. 
112. ld. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. AB a practical matter, it is 
likely that attorneys will plead against all manufacturers known to have produced DES 
at any time in history. This would appear to obviate the problem of joinder of a substan-
tial share of potential defendants. Interview with Professor Neil Levy, Editor, California 
Tort Reporter, in San Francisco (Nov. 3, 1980). 
113. Because no lower court decisions effectively apply and explain the substantial 
percentage requirement, practitioners are uncertain of its impact. Levy Interview, supra 
note 112. Appellant's attorney found the court's substantial percentage requirement to 
be an unclear standard as well. Brent Interview, supra note 19. 
114. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. 
115. The Sindell court clearly rejected the 75-80% requirement suggested in FORD-
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The dissent vigorously rejected this element of market share 
liability. Justice Richardson argued that market share liability 
violates fundamental tenets of tort law by setting a precedent 
for liability where it is more likely than not that a particular 
defendant did not cause the alleged harm.us 
Under market share liability, if defendants fail to meet their 
burden of proof, plaintiff should prevail and liability will be ap-
portioned on the basis of each defendant's share of the product 
market.117 Problems in market share damages arise when consid-
ered against a background of apportionment under California 
doctrines of partial indemnity and comparative fault.lls For ex-
ample, suppose plaintiff joins as defendants eighty percent of 
the possible market, and B company is determined to be respon-
sible for sixty percent of that market. In such a case what is B's 
liability in percentage of the judgment? 
Does B pay sixty percent of the total damages awarded to 
plaintiff? Or does B pay sixty percent of eighty percent (B's per-
centage of the market joined) of the judgment for plaintiff? The 
majority opinion seems to support the first position.us 
Other difficulties arise when considering market share ap-
portionment. Assuming joinder of a substantial percentage of 
HAM Comment, supra note 4, at 966.26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937,163 Cal. Rptr. at 
145. 
116. The dissent reiterates the causation requirement of precise manufacturer iden-
tity. Plaintiff must show the defendant "actually was the manufacturer of the product 
which caused the injury •••. " 26 Cal. 3d at 614, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146. 
The dissent states that the court abandons traditional tort doctrine with the adop-
tion of market share liability. The dissent argues that a drug company which only sold a 
small share of DES (e.g., 10%) is unlikely to have caused plaintiff's injury. In such a case 
"defendant may be held proportionately liable even though mathematically it is more 
likely than not that it played no role whatever in causing plaintiffs' injuries." 26 Cal. 3d 
at 616, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147. 
117. "Each defendant will be held liable for the proportion of the judgment repre-
sented by its share of that market unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the 
product which caused plaintiffs' injuries." ld. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 
145. It appears from the court's language that "that market" would refer to the DES 
market at the time and place in which each DES mQther bought and used the drug. Also, 
the common meaning of "plaintiffs" would indicate that the market must be determined 
for each individual plaintiff's mother. ld. 
118. ld. at 613, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. 
119. "[E]ach defendant will be held liable for the proportion of the judgment repre-
sented by its share of that market." 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 
145 (emphasis added). 
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the possible defendants, the question arises whether the individ-
ual defendant's apportioned damages will be limited to its mar-
ket share, or whether, because of the priniciple of joint and sev-
eral liability, it will be liable for the percentage of the total 
judgment that its share of the market bears to the total market 
represented by the manufacturers who are joined as defendants. 
The smaller the percentage of the market joined as defendants, 
the greater the discrepancy. 
For example, will a defendant who has a sixty percent share 
of the market be liable, where the total market share repre-
sented (i.e., a "substantial percentage") is eighty percent, and 
where the damages award to plaintiff is $100,000, for $60,000, 
(sixty percent) or $75,000, (seventy-five percent), the portion of 
the total damages represented by the defendant's market share 
as compared to the market shares of the defendants as a group? 
The majority opinion can be read to suggest either result. 
The court announced a rule whereby damage apportionment will 
approximate defendant responsibility. This would indicate the 
figure of sixty percent. However, the court also assures that, be-
cause defendants may implead other drug companies, no 
prejudice to defendants will result. Such a statement indicates 
the court would endorse a seventy-five percent result where only 
eighty percent of the market is joined. The dissenters, by con-
trast, argue that the defendants will certainly be prejudiced by a 
rule imposing liability as in the seventy-five percent example.120 
The most troublesome problems presented by Sindell arise 
with market share apportionment of damages among a very low, 
yet "substantial," percentage of joined defendants. If the per-
centage of joined defendants is low enough, the apportioned 
damages will bear little, if any, relationship to defendant 
responsibility.121 
120. "[U]nder the majority's reasoning those defendants who are brought to trial in 
this state will bear effective joint responsibility for 100 percent of plaintiffs' injuries de· 
spite the fact that their 'substantial' aggregate market share may be considerably less." 
26 Cal. 3d at 617, 607 P.2d at 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148. 
121. Such an inability to join defendants may occur where defendants are not sub-
ject to the court's jurisdiction, are bankrupt or are no longer in operation. Although the 
Sindell court anticipates discrepancy between defendant fault and liability, the court's 
response indicates that market share is intended to apply only in situations'where any 
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To illustrate, suppose that 1) the "substantial percentage" 
joined was only sixty percent; 2) defendant A's market share was 
forty percent of that sixty percent; and, 3) the judgment 
awarded was $100,000. In such a case, defendant A must pay 
forty percent or $40,000, plus 40/60 (two thirds) of that amount 
of the judgment represented by the wrongdoers who were not 
joined (or $26,644, again two thirds). This makes A's total re-
sponsibility $66,644, or, sixty-six percent of the total award. 
This is clearly more than a "minor discrepancy."I22 
The court notes there may be some practical problems in 
defining and determining the applicable market share.12s Beyond 
these threshold practical problems of joinder, however, market 
share raises two other important questions. How does the practi-
tioner plead a case of market share? And, how do courts use it to 
fashion equitable results?124 
c. A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
As indicated above, it is difficult to determme the Sindell 
requirement for joinder of a substantial percentage of the mar-
ket, when applying market share analysis. The opinion indicates 
that a substantial percentage should be a high percentage of the 
available market.12~ 
The cornerstone of the court's new market share is the rule 
of Summers v. Tice, which shifted the burden of proof when all 
discrepancy will be minor. See 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. 
122. "[T)he difficulty of apportioning damages among defendant producers in exact 
relation to their market share does not seriously militate against the rule we adopt." [d. 
123. The drug companies argue that accurate market share data for DES does not 
exist. They assert there are no accurate records of how much DES was sold as a miscar-
riage preventative. [d. at 613, n.29, 607 P.2d at 937 n.29, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145 n.29. 
124. See Birnbaum, DES Concert-ot-Action Theory: New Cases Bring Contusion, 
Nat'l L.J., May 4, 1981, at 31, col. 1. Language in Sindell suggests market share may also 
apply to negligence actions for DES injuries. Therefore, DES plaintiffs should plead neg-
ligence under market share liability. See generally 1 CAL. TORT. REP. 106 (1980). 
125. The court indicates that the share joined is substantial only if the burden of 
proof may be shifted without injustice to the defendants. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 
937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. Although the court preferred a "substantial" percentage to 
the 75-80% suggested by FORDHAM Comment, supra note 4, at 996, shifting the burden 
of proof in Sindell occurred with a joinder of over 90% of the appropriate DES market. 
Where plaintiff has joined less than 85 %, an alarming discrepancy arises between market 
share and liability. This level of minimum joinder appears to alleviate the inequitable 
results which prohibit a shift of the burden of proof. For further discussion, see notes 
130-135 intra and accompanying text. 
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(100 percent) of the possible defendants were joined, but were 
unascertainable.126 Nevertheless, the court refused to apply an 
alternative liability theory, as stated in Summers, because of the 
possibility that none of the :five defendants joined were person-
ally negligent.12'1 Instead, a "diluted" Summers rule was applied 
because the court felt that, by joinder of a substantial percent-
age of the possible defendants, injustice to defendants could be 
avoided.128 The court acknowledged that the SindeU plaintiffs 
met the "substantial percentage" requirement by an allegation 
of ninety percent joinder .129 
Clearly, the Sindell court sought to achieve two broad pol-
icy-oriented goals: that plaintiffs be able to state a cause of ac-
tion in the DES suits, and that the manufacturers of a product 
which did not injure a plaintiff be free of liability for plaintiff's 
injuries. The court seeks joinder of defendants as close to 100 
percent as possible, but does not want to preclude a meritorious 
claim. 
The following suggestion may aid cases in which the plain-
tiffs sue only a small percentage of the possible drug producers, 
yet reach a large enough share of the market to achieve the am-
biguous requirement of "substantial percentage."130 
The proposed procedure has three stages: complaint, discov-
ery, and pretrial conference. Each stage remains generally con-
sistent with modern pretrial civil practice. 
At the complaint stage plaintiff would be .required to join 
any percentage of possible drug company defendants which 
would meet the undefined substantial percentage articulated in 
126. See notes 37-42 supra and accompanying text. 
127. 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. 
128. "As we have seen, an undiluted Summers rule is inappropriate" Id. at 611, 607 
P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143. The court announced its substantial percentage re-
quirement saying that the court approached causation in DES cases from a different 
perspective, apparently a "diluted" Summers rule of causation. The court will accept less 
than the 100% joinder of Summers, but requires at least that which would avoid unjust 
results. 
129. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. 
130. The plural, "plaintiffs" and "defendants," is used in this section because DES 
suits are class actions in many cases. The proposal would not be altered, however, if only 
one plaintiff sued. 
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Sindell.131 The court would at that point refuse to hear defen-
dant motions based upon lack of cause-in-fact due to plaintiff's 
failure to identify the responsible defendant.132 Motions on 
other grounds would be heard as usual.133 
Immediately after defendants answer plaintiffs' complaint, 
the joined defendants may attempt to cross-complain against 
other possibly responsible drug companies, and plaintiffs may 
begin discovery. By use of discovery, plaintiffs.may acquire in-
formation as to defendant's market share.13' Thus, by the time 
of pretrial conference, plaintiffs should be able to show an 
eighty-five percent joinder of defendants. 
Establishing a requirement of eighty-five percent joinder by 
the pretrial conference stage would enable plaintiffs to bring 
meritorious claims as well as limit defendant liability to an ap-
proximation of each defendant's responsibility for the harm 
caused. The eighty-five percent requirement allows plaintiffs to 
bring meritorious claims because it permits plaintiffs a substan-
tial period of time after the complaint stage in which plaintiffs 
may, through discovery, gain information of the defendants' 
market share. The eighty-five percent joinder requirement rep-
resents a compromise between the required 100 percent joinder 
of Summers and the unspecified Sindell requirement, which 
could permit joinder of as few as fifty to sixty percent of the 
possible DES defendants. The advantage of an eighty-five per-
cent joinder requirement is basically mathematical. If eighty-five 
percent of the available defendants are joined by the time of 
trial, mathematically it appears that defendant liability will not 
131. Such a procedure is consistent with the court's desire that plaintiff join as de-
fendants a substantial percentage of the possible market. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 
937,163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. 
132. Neither demurrer or motion for summary judgment would lie. 
133. Permissible motions would include defendants' motions for summary judgment 
and demurrers based upon the fact that defendants' product could not possibly have 
caused the harm alleged by plaintiff. See 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. 
Rptr. at 145. 
134. It is unlikely defendants will implead other defendants if it would help plaintiff 
meet joinder requirements to do so. Because plaintiffs may obtain market share informa-
tion by use of interrogatories, requests for admission, and by requests for production of 
drug company sales records, plaintiffs should not be at a serious disadvantage. Any set-
tlement negotiations would likely be enhanced by knowledge of plaintiff's potential for 
securing the requisite 85% joinder, and the likelihood and potential liability of each de-
fendant in a judgment for plaintiff. 
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vary so greatly from defendant responsibility as to cause sub-
stantial inequity.l3G 
A pretrial hearing is suggested, at which time the court 
would require a showing that plaintiff had joined eighty-five per-
cent of the possible defendants, based upon market share, before 
setting the action for arbitration or trial. If plaintiff is unable to 
make such a showing the court may then hear motions 'by defen-
dant concerning plaintiff's inability to show cause-in-fact. 
IV. INDUSTRIAL AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO 
MARKET SHARE LIABILITY 
Drug companies and members of the insurance defense bar 
join the position taken by the Sindell dissent: Eased causation 
requirements and the possibility of high damage awardsl36 con-
trovert social policy and guarantee a deleterious effect upon the 
entire drug industry.l3'1 While this argument is not without some 
merit, cost allocation devices will by and large assure continued 
solvency. Such devices include the use of captive insurers,t38 and 
price increases to offset the potential of high damages awards.l39 
135. This procedure, would correct the flaws noted previously at notes 113-124 
supra and accompanying text. The court should use its discretion here to allow plaintiffs 
more time in which to join the requisite 85%, if it appears likely that plaintiffs will be 
able to do so. 
136. In one class action suit for DES-related injuries, plaintiffs sought over one bil-
lion dollars in damages. N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1977, at 16, coL 22. 
137. "[C]onsiderable doubts have been expressed regarding the ability of the drug 
industry, and especially its smaller members, to bear the substantial economic costs 
(from both damages awards and high insurance premiums) inherent in imposing an in-
dustry-wide liability." 26 Cal. 3d at 618-19, 607 P.2d at 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. 149. "Because 
some small [drug companies] have already found themselves unable to afford products 
liability insurance, the effect of much higher premiums could be devastating to many 
small and middle-sized companies." Comment, Industry-Wide Liability, 13 SUFFOLK 
U.L. REv. 980, 1003 (1979). 
138. Where the risks in a certain industry are extremely high, some companies have 
found it useful to establish and maintain their own insurance company. The use of self-
retained drug company insurers may provide guaranteed coverage for extensive damages 
awards at premium levels which the company can afford. Such systems have already 
been established in the drug industry. See FORDHAM Comment, supra note, 25 at 1004. 
139. It is likely that the cost to drug companies of high damages awards will be 
passed along to the consumer through higher drug prices. The Sindell Court preferred 
market share liability to preemptive DES legislation because such legislation would not 
address the doctrinal issue of causation but would increase taxes for California citizens. 
26 Cal. 3d at 613, n.30, 607 P.2d at 938, n.30, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146 n.30. Nevertheless, it 
is clear the cost of DES injuries will most likely be borne by the consumer citizen under 
market share liability. 
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The social policy at issue questions the proper role of regu-
latory and judicial inhibitions upon the research and develop-
ment of new drugs.14o Such an inhibition would be distressing if 
an extensive amount of drug company resources were tradition-
ally committed for socially useful new drug research.u1 Most 
drug company research, however, is not oriented towards new 
drugs. Sources indicate that drug company research and devel-
opment funds are primarily expended to discover patentable 
varients of existing drugs and alternative cures for common dis-
eases.142 Initially at least, it is clear the effect of Sindell will 
neither bankrupt the complaining drug companies, nor severely 
inhibit socially useful new drug research. 
In support of the policy interests mentioned above, and to 
circumvent the effect of Sindell, drug company interests have 
lobbied for legislative chances which would reduce or preclude 
chances of adverse judgments.us In the California state legisla-
tive session immediately following the publication of Sindell, 
Other factors also contraindicate the policy considerations cited in the dissent. The 
drug industry, unlike many others, does business in a marketplace of comparatively in-
elastic demand; an increase in the price of a drug will not substantially lessen the de-
mand. This compounds the excellent economic health of the drug industry in general, 
and indicates continued post-Sindell solvency. See SENATE SUBCOMM. ON MONOPOLY, SE-
LECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS IN THE DRUG INDUSTRY, 92d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 33-34 (Comm. Print 1972). 
140. "It seems to me that liability in the manner created by the majority must inevi-
tably inhibit, if not the research or development, at least the dissemination of new phar-
maceutical drugs." 26 Cal. 3d at 620, 607 P.2d at 942, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 150. (Richardson, 
J., dissenting). 
141. "The bulk of pharmaceutical research is definitely directed toward increasing 
company profits by developing marketable drugs which will sell in the largest volumes 
and make the largest profits." M. DIXON, supra note 4, at § 6.03. See FORDHAM Com-
ment, supra note 4, at 1006. 
142. M. DIXON, supra note 4, at § 6.03. Creation of patentable drug varients and. 
alternative cures for common diseases allows drug companies to capitalize on drug popu-
larity without the cost of the initial drug research. Because drug manufacturers would 
rather not research a potentially unprofitable new drug, "there are many seriously 
debilitating diseases which would justify the idealistic research suggested by industry 
publicity, but which now are starved for research funds." ld. 
143. All post-Sindell developments occur in a very media-conscious environment. In 
discussing a defendant's refusal to settle a case concerning noncancerous DES injury, a 
plaintiff's attorney noted this strategy: "Lilly spent an inordinate amount of money to 
defend a case, which he did not consider particularly significant, in order to win a victory 
that the company could trumpet in the mass media." The attorney "said he was sur-
prised when the defense turned down his offer to settle. • • since the legal defense obvi-
ously cost much more •..• " Ranii, DES Suit Won by Drug Manufacturer, Nat'l L.J., 
Dec. 8, 1980, at 11, col. 1. 
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two bills concerning DES were introduced. To a bill establishing 
a DES education and screening program,144 a controversial rider 
was attached.145 The rider would have effectively eliminated 
market share liability by legislatively reinstating traditional pre-
Bindell concepts of causation.146 Although the original DES edu-
cation and screening bill was enacted into law, effective January 
1, 1981/47 the rider died in committee.14S Almost certainly, this 
will be an area of continuing controversy.149 
V. CONCLUSION 
Bindell bears great importance for the DES plaintiffs in 
California. The decision "advances traditional principles of tort 
law. A remedy now exists for the DES plaintiff who is innocently 
unable to establish precise causation. Nevertheless, a lack of 
"mathematical exactitude"150 may lead to defendant's liability 
for injuries which they did not cause. This can only be remedied 
144. S.B. 1392, 1980 Cal. Stats. ch. 776 enacted S.B. 1392 (codified at CAL. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE § 1367.8 (concerning health care and hospital expense contract exclu· 
sions of DES coverage); §§ 349-349.5 (establishing a screening program); and CAL. INs. 
CODE §§ 10119.7, 11512.18 (concerning insurance or hospital exclusions of DES cover-
age) (West Supp. 1981». The basic purposes behind the bill included: 
'I) education of the public as to DES hazards; 
2) establishment of screeniDg programs through private health care providers; 
3) guarantee that insurance contractors and health care service plans would not be 
allowed to write provisions excluding DES-related injury coverage; and 
4) provisions for funding. Senate Bill 1392 was introduced by State Senators Wat-
son, Dills, Marks, Nejedly, Petris, Robbins, Rodda, Roberti, Stiern, Vuich, and Wilson 
on January 29, 1980. 
145. A.B. 3344, 1979-1980 Sess •. A.B. 3344 would have amended CAL. ClY. CODE 
§ 1431 and added CAL. ClY. PRoe. CODE §§ 624.1 and 875-877. 
146. According to the Legislative Counsel's Digest, the bill "would prohibit liability 
in product liability cases, unless plaiDtiff proves by preponderance of the evidence that 
the seller's own product was a proxiDlate cause of the injury, death, or damage; and 
would provide that that limitation would apply to all pending claims or actions." A.B. 
3344 was introduced by State Representative McAlister. 
147. 1980 Cal. Stats., ch. 776. 
148. A.B. 3344 died in the Assembly Judiciary Committee, Nov. 11, 1980. 
149. There is a reasonably good chance that legislation attempting to negate the 
effect of Sindell will be proposed in the upcomiDg legislative session. Personnel changes 
in the Assembly Judiciary Committee may encourage attempts to introduce a bill similar 
to A.B. 3344, as three members are expected to leave for new posts this year. Interview 
with Bill George, Consultant to California State Assembly Finance, Insurance, and Com-
merce Comm. (Oct. 30, 1980). 
All attempts to propose new anti-Sindelilegislation will likely meet with opposition 
from the California Trial Lawyers Association, as well as from medical and women's 
rights groups. 
150. 26 Cal. 3d at 613, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. 
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by examination of specific application of market share liability 
at various degrees of defendant joinder in all stages of civil pro-
cedure before and during trial. 
Often the creation of new legal doctrine from elements of 
the old occurs in response to changing societal needs and repre-
sents the best of judicial thought: flexibility with reason. In 
Sindell, the California Supreme Court has established the basis 
for such doctrinal evolution. By conscientious application of an 
uncertain standard, the appellate courts may further that judi-
cial goal. 
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